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Aboriginal rights in Canada are often viewed as specific rights—rights
that are grounded in the specific practices and customs of particular
aboriginal peoples and that differ from people to people. This article
argues that these specific rights are in fact concrete instantiations of a
panoply of generic aboriginal rights that are presumptively held by all
aboriginal groups under Canadian common law. They include the
right to conclude treaties, the right to customary law, the right to
honourable treatment by the Crown, the right to an ancestral
territory, the right of cultural integrity, and the right of selfgovernment. These basic rights have a uniform character, which does
not change from group to group. Specific rights, by contrast, arise
under the auspices of generic rights and assume different forms in
different aboriginal groups, depending on the particular circumstances
of each group. Ranged between generic rights and specific rights are
rights of intermediate generality, which relate to particular subjectmatters such as sustenance, spirituality and language. The article
suggests that this scheme provides a simple and practical way of
understanding the otherwise bewildering array of aboriginal rights
recognized in section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.
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WHAT ARE ABORIGINAL RIGHTS?
1

Brian Slattery

This paper will appear in Foster, Raven & Webber, eds. Let
Right Be Done: Calder, Aboriginal Title, and the Future of
Indigenous Rights (Vancouver: University of British Columbia
Press, forthcoming in 2007). The paper is still subject to editing,
so if you would like to quote from it, please contact me first at
slattery@yorku.ca.

I. INTRODUCTION
Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 recognizes and
affirms the “existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the
aboriginal peoples of Canada”.2 The provision clearly builds on
the Supreme Court’s recognition of aboriginal rights in the
3
landmark Calder case, decided a decade earlier. However the
sparse wording leaves open a number of fundamental questions.
What precisely are aboriginal rights and where do they come
from? Are they based on indigenous customary law, or the
common law, or perhaps international law, or even natural law?
Do all aboriginal peoples have the same set of aboriginal rights
or does each group have its own specific set?

1

Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. The author is grateful
to Professors Kent McNeil and Jeremy Webber for their helpful comments on
an earlier draft of this paper.

2

Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11.
3

Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia (1973), 34 D.L.R.(3d.) 145
(S.C.C.).

2
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These are difficult questions, which do not allow for simple or
pat answers. Since 1982, many important pieces of the puzzle
have been furnished by the Supreme Court of Canada in a series
of significant decisions. However the pieces still lie scattered
about in a somewhat disconnected fashion. This paper attempts
to fit them together and fill in the gaps, so as to provide a
coherent vision of aboriginal rights in Canada. The paper deals
first with the important distinction between specific and generic
rights, which emerges from the Court’s judgments in the Van
der Peet 4 and Delgamuukw5 cases. It then discusses the main
types of generic rights and their relationship to specific rights,
arguing that generic rights provide the foundation for specific
rights and supply the criteria that govern them. Generic rights
are not only uniform in character, but also universal in
distribution: they comprise a set of fundamental rights held by
all aboriginal groups in Canada.

II. SPECIFIC AND GENERIC RIGHTS6
In the Van der Peet case,7 the Supreme Court recognized a class
of aboriginal rights whose nature and scope are determined by
the particular circumstances of each specific aboriginal group.
The Court held that in order to constitute an aboriginal right
protected by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, a present-day
activity of an aboriginal group must be based on a practice,

4

R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.).

5

Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.).

6

This section draws on Brian Slattery, "Making Sense of Aboriginal and
Treaty Rights" (2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 196 at 211-13.

7

R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.). See also the summary of the
test in Mitchell v. M.N.R. [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 (S.C.C.) at paras. 12-13.
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custom or tradition that was integral to the distinctive culture
8
of that specific group in the period prior to European contact.
To qualify as “integral” to a particular culture, a practice has to
be a central and significant part of the culture, one of the things
that makes the society what it is. So, aspects of an aboriginal
society that are only incidental or occasional do not qualify;
they must be defining and central features of the society.9 A
practice has to be a characteristic element of the culture;
however, it does not need to be unique or different from the
practices of other societies. So, for example, fishing for food may
constitute an aboriginal right, even though it is practised by
10
many different societies around the world.
The rights recognized in Van der Peet are what we may call
specific rights—rights whose existence, nature and scope are
determined by factors that are particular to each aboriginal
group. Specific rights differ from group to group and sometimes
take quite specialized forms. For example, in the Gladstone

8

R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.) at paras. 46, 60.

9

Ibid. at paras. 55-56. In R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray, 2006 SCC 54 (S.C.C.), the
Supreme Court stressed that this criterion should be applied flexibly
“because the object is to provide cultural security and continuity for the
particular aboriginal society” (para. 33). It does not mean that the pre-contact
practice has to go to the “core of the society’s identity”, in the sense of
constituting its single most important defining character (para. 40). Nor
should the notion that the practice must be a “defining feature” of the
aboriginal society be used “to create artificial barriers to the recognition and
affirmation of aboriginal rights” (para. 41). The purpose is “to understand the
way of life of the particular aboriginal society, pre-contact, and to determine
how the claimed right relates to it” (para. 40).

10

R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.) at paras. 71-72. The point is
reiterated and sharpened in R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray, 2006 SCC 54 (S.C.C.) at
paras. 42-46.

4
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case11 the Supreme Court held that the members of the Heiltsuk
people of British Columbia had an aboriginal right to trade in
herring spawn on kelp (a kind of seaweed) and that this trade
might be conducted on a commercial basis. The Court’s holding
was based on historical and anthropological evidence showing
that the Heiltsuk had engaged in such a trade as an integral part
of their culture prior to contact with Europeans. The right was
obviously one that few other aboriginal groups would be able to
claim. It was rooted in the distinctive practices of the Heiltsuk
Nation, and indeed was confined to trade in a single, rather
exotic commodity.
In Van der Peet, the Supreme Court expressed the view that all
aboriginal rights were specific rights.12 However, this proved to
be a premature generalization. It was quietly discarded by the
13
Court in the Delgamuukw case, decided the following year.
The hereditary chiefs of the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en peoples
asserted aboriginal title to a large tract of land in northern
British Columbia, a claim that was contested by the British

11

R. v. Gladstone [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 (S.C.C.).

12

R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.) at para. 69.

13

Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.). For
discussion, see Owen Lippert, ed. Beyond the Nass Valley: National
Implications of the Supreme Court's Delgamuukw Decision (Vancouver: The
Fraser Institute, 2000); Kent McNeil, Emerging Justice? Essays on Indigenous
Rights in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan
Native Law Centre, 2001) at 58-160. The concept of aboriginal title is
analysed in Brian Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights" (1987) 66 Can.
Bar Rev. 727; Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1989); Patrick Macklem, "What's Law Got to Do With It?
The Protection of Aboriginal Title in Canada" (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J.
125; Kent McNeil, "Aboriginal Title and the Supreme Court: What's
Happening?" (2006) 69 Sask. L. Rev. (forthcoming); Brian Slattery, “The
Metamorphosis of Aboriginal Title” (2006) 85 Can. Bar Rev. (forthcoming).
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Columbia government. In argument before the Court, the
parties to the case advanced strikingly different conceptions of
aboriginal title, which effectively raised the issue whether
aboriginal title was a specific right, grounded in factors
particular to each aboriginal group, or a right of a more
generalized nature.
The aboriginal claimants maintained that aboriginal title was
equivalent to an inalienable fee simple, arguing that it was a
right of a fixed and uniform character, similar in this respect to
standard estates known to the English law of real property.
According to this view, the nature of aboriginal title did not vary
from group to group, depending on their particular culture or
customs, but was the same in all cases. As such, aboriginal title
did not constitute a specific right but was a right of a
standardized character.
In reply, the governments of British Columbia and Canada
maintained that aboriginal title to land was simply a collection
of particular aboriginal rights to engage in specific culture-based
activities on the land. In other words, aboriginal title had no
definite character; it was just a bundle of specific aboriginal
rights, each of which had to be proven independently. At best,
aboriginal title gave a group the right to the exclusive use and
occupation of the land in order to exercise these specific rights.
The group would not be entitled to use the land for any purposes
it wanted; it would be limited to exercising the rights in its
particular bundle. In effect, in order to engage in a certain
activity on the land, a claimant group would have to prove that
the particular activity in question satisfied the Van der Peet
test—that it was an element of a practice, custom or tradition

6
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that was integral to the group’s distinctive society at the time of
14
European contact.
So, according to the governmental argument, the content of
aboriginal title was variable. It differed from group to group,
depending on the group’s particular cultural practices at the
time of European contact. By contrast, according to the
aboriginal parties, the content of aboriginal title was uniform
and did not depend on the group’s historical practices. If a group
had aboriginal title, it could use the land in any way it wanted,
subject only to a restriction on transfers to third parties.
In its judgment, the Supreme Court rejected the governmental
argument and adopted a position close to that of the aboriginal
parties. Chief Justice Lamer stated that aboriginal title is
governed by two principles.15 Under the first principle, a group
holding aboriginal title has the right to the exclusive use and
occupation of the land for a broad range of purposes. These
purposes do not need to be grounded in the group’s ancestral
practices, customs and traditions. So, a group that originally
lived mainly by hunting, fishing and gathering would be free to
farm the land, raise cattle on it, exploit its natural resources or
use it for residential, commercial or industrial purposes.
Nevertheless, according to the second principle, land held under
aboriginal title is subject to an “inherent limit”. This prevents
the land from being used in a manner that is irreconcilable with
the fundamental nature of the group’s attachment to the land, so
as to ensure that the land is preserved for use by future
generations. In other words, the group may not ruin the land or
render it unusable for its original purposes.

14

Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.) at paras.
110-11.

15

Ibid. at paras. 116-32.
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The crucial point to note here is that the Supreme Court treats
aboriginal title as a uniform right, whose basic dimensions do
not vary from group to group according to their traditional ways
of life. All groups holding aboriginal title have fundamentally
the same kind of right, subject only to minor variations
stemming from the inherent limit. In effect, the Supreme Court
recognizes that aboriginal title is not a specific right of the kind
envisaged in Van der Peet, or even a bundle of specific rights.
Aboriginal title is what we may call a generic right—a right of a
standardized character that is basically identical in all aboriginal
groups where it occurs. The fundamental dimensions of the
right are determined by the common law doctrine of aboriginal
rights rather than by the unique circumstances of each group.
In short, in Van der Peet and Delgamuukw the Supreme Court
recognizes two different kinds of aboriginal rights—specific
rights and generic rights. Specific rights are rights whose nature
and scope are defined by factors pertaining to a particular
aboriginal group. As such, they vary in character from group to
group. Of course, different aboriginal groups may have similar
specific rights, but this is just happenstance; it does not flow
from the nature of the right. By contrast, generic rights are rights
of a uniform character whose basic contours are established by
the common law of aboriginal rights. All aboriginal groups
holding a certain generic right have basically the same kind of
right. The essential nature of the right does not vary according
to factors peculiar to the group.
The distinction between specific and generic rights gives rise to
a number of important questions. First, is aboriginal title the
sole instance of a generic right, or are there others? Second,
what is the precise relationship between generic and specific
rights; are they completely distinct or do they overlap in some
fashion? Third, are generic rights not only uniform in character
but also universal in distribution; that is, are they held by all
aboriginal groups, or only by certain groups and not others?
Fourth, are generic and specific rights both grounded in

8
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historical practice; if so, are they open to evolution and change?
The remainder of this paper will be devoted to answering these
questions.

III. THE RANGE AND CHARACTER OF GENERIC
RIGHTS
Is aboriginal title the only example of a generic right? If we
review the Van der Peet decision in the light of Delgamuukw,
we come to a surprising conclusion. Recall that in Van der Peet
the Court holds that aboriginal groups have the right to engage
in activities based on the practices, customs and traditions that
were integral to their distinctive cultures at the time of
European contact. To be “integral” to a particular culture, a
practice must be a central and significant part of the culture, one
of the things that makes the society what it is.16 When we stand
back from this decision, we can see that it has the effect of
recognizing another generic right: it holds that aboriginal
peoples have the generic right to maintain the central and
significant features of their historical cultures.
At the abstract level, this right has a fixed and uniform
character. Each and every aboriginal group has the same general
right—to maintain the principal aspects of their culture. Of
course, what is “central and significant” varies from group to
group, in accordance with their particular circumstances, so that
at the concrete level the abstract right blossoms into a variety of
distinctive specific rights—a matter we will come back to later.
However, the point to grasp here is that the abstract right itself
is uniform. As such, it constitutes a generic right—what we may
call the right of cultural integrity.

16

R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.).

2007]

WHAT ARE ABORIGINAL RIGHTS?

9

Are there still other generic aboriginal rights? A little reflection
shows that the answer is yes. Here is a tentative list of generic
rights, which includes the two rights already identified:
•
•
•
•
•
•

the right to conclude treaties
the right to customary law
the right to honourable treatment by the Crown
the right to an ancestral territory (aboriginal title)
the right of cultural integrity
the right of self-government

This list is not necessarily complete, and some rights (such as
the right of cultural integrity) may need to be sub-divided.
However, it includes the most important generic rights tacitly
recognized in Supreme Court cases so far. As the jurisprudence
evolves, further generic rights may come to light. Here we will
say a few words about each of the rights listed, enough to give a
taste of the subject.

A. THE RIGHT TO CONCLUDE TREATIES
Aboriginal peoples have the right to conclude binding treaties
with the Crown and to enforce the Crown’s treaty promises in
17
the courts. At Canadian common law, the treaty-making
capacity of aboriginal groups has a fixed and uniform character
which does not vary from group to group. The capacity of the
Blackfoot is no greater or less than that of the Micmac or the
Innu. All have the same power to negotiate treaties with the
Crown, which are protected under s. 35(1) of the Constitution
Act, 1982. As such, the right to conclude treaties constitutes a
generic aboriginal right.

17

The capacity of Indian nations to conclude treaties with the Crown is
comprehensively reviewed in R. v. Sioui [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025 (S.C.C.) at 103743.

10
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The right of aboriginal peoples to treat with the Crown is
matched by the Crown’s right to treat with aboriginal peoples
under the royal prerogative. In both cases, the power flows from
the inter-societal law of aboriginal rights, which forms part of
18
the common law of Canada. Since the time of Confederation,
the Crown’s power in this area has vested primarily in the
federal government under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act,
1867.
The right to conclude treaties is one of the most important of
the generic rights held by aboriginal peoples, with roots reaching
back to the earliest days of European settlement on the
continent. It is a highly distinctive right, without exact parallels
in other spheres of Canadian constitutional law. Although
provincial governments may of course conclude agreements
with the federal government, these agreements have a quite
different character and do not hold the constitutional status and
protection enjoyed by aboriginal treaties.19

18

For discussion of the inter-societal character of this law, see Brian Slattery,
"Understanding Aboriginal Rights" (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727 at 736-41,
744-45; Brian Slattery, "Making Sense of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights" (2000)
79 Can. Bar Rev. 196 at 198-206; Brian Slattery, “The Metamorphosis of
Aboriginal Title” (2006) 85 Can. Bar Rev. (forthcoming). For parallel
approaches, see Mark D. Walters, "British Imperial Constitutional Law and
Aboriginal Rights: A Comment on Delgamuukw v. British Columbia" (1992)
17 Queen's L.J. 350; Jeremy Webber, "Relations of Force and Relations of
Justice: The Emergence of Normative Community between Colonists and
Aboriginal Peoples" (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall L.J. 623; John Borrows, "With or
Without You: First Nations Law (in Canada)" (1996) 41 McGill L.J. 629; John
Borrows & Leonard I. Rotman, "The Sui Generis Nature of Aboriginal Rights:
Does It Make a Difference?" (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 9; Mark D. Walters, "The
"Golden Thread" of Continuity: Aboriginal Customs at Common Law and
Under the Constitution Act, 1982" (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 711.
19

On the constitutional effects of federal-provincial agreements, see
Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.) [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525, and
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B. THE RIGHT TO CUSTOMARY LAW
Aboriginal peoples have the right to maintain and develop their
distinctive systems of customary law within an all-embracing
federal framework that features multiple and overlapping legal
20
systems and levels of government. The introduction of French
and English laws into the colonies founded by the European
powers did not have the effect of wiping out the customary laws
of aboriginal groups, which continued to operate within their
respective spheres. As Justice McLachlin observes in Van der
Peet:21
The history of the interface of Europeans and the
common law with aboriginal peoples is a long one. As
might be expected of such a long history, the
principles by which the interface has been governed
have not always been consistently applied. Yet
running through this history, from its earliest
beginnings to the present time is a golden thread—the
recognition by the common law of the ancestral laws
and customs [of] the aboriginal peoples who occupied
the land prior to European settlement.

discussion in Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3rd ed.
(Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1992) at 12.3(a).
20

See Connolly v. Woolrich (1867), 17 R.J.R.Q. 75 (Que. S.C.); Casimel v.
Insurance Corp. of British Columbia [1994] 2 C.N.L.R. 22 (B.C.C.A.); R. v.
Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.) esp. at paras. 38-40; Delgamuukw v.
British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.) at paras. 146-48; Campbell v.
British Columbia (Attorney General) [2000] 4 C.N.L.R. 1 (B.C.S.C.) at paras.
83-136; Mitchell v. M.N.R. [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 (S.C.C.) at paras. 9-10, 61-64,
141-54.
21

R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.) at para. 263. Justice
McLachlin was dissenting, but not on this point.

12
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The right of aboriginal peoples to maintain their own laws is a
generic right, whose basic scope is determined by the common
law doctrine of aboriginal rights. It does not differ from group to
group or from area to area. The Mohawk and Haida peoples are
equally entitled to enjoy their respective systems of customary
law. Nevertheless, the legal systems protected by the generic
right obviously differ in content. Mohawk laws are not the same
as Haida laws.
Aboriginal systems of customary law have a status similar to
that of provincial legal systems. At Confederation, the
Constitution Act, 1867 provided that the laws in force in the
provinces would continue in force, subject to the legislative
powers of the federal and provincial governments.22 Existing
bodies of provincial law were carried forward into the new
federation, and the power to amend or repeal those laws was
distributed between the two main levels of government.

C. THE
CROWN

RIGHT TO HONOURABLE TREATMENT BY THE

Aboriginal peoples have the right to the fiduciary protection of
the Crown and the right to the performance of particular
23
fiduciary duties flowing from that relationship. In the Sparrow
case,24 the Supreme Court stated:
...the Government has the responsibility to act in a
fiduciary capacity with respect to aboriginal peoples.

22

Section 129, Constitution Act, 1867.

23

See Guerin v. The Queen [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 (S.C.C.); R. v. Sparrow [1990] 1
S.C.R. 1075 (S.C.C.); R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.) at paras.
24-25; Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada [2002] S.C.R. (S.C.C.).

24

R. v. Sparrow [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 (S.C.C.) at 1108.
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The relationship between the Government and
aboriginals is trust-like, rather than adversarial, and
contemporary
recognition
and
affirmation
of
aboriginal rights must be defined in light of this
historic relationship.
Although the Court was referring here to s. 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982, subsequent Supreme Court decisions
have made it clear that the Crown’s fiduciary responsibility is
not confined to this context but accompanies and controls the
discretionary powers that the Crown historically has assumed
over the lives of aboriginal peoples.25 As McLachlin C.J. notes in
26
the Mitchell case, from early days the Crown asserted
sovereignty over aboriginal lands and underlying title to the soil:
from this assertion “arose an obligation to treat aboriginal
peoples fairly and honourably, and to protect them from
exploitation”.
At the most abstract level, the right to honourable treatment by
the Crown is a generic right, which vests uniformly in aboriginal
peoples across Canada. The point is underlined in the Haida
Nation case,27 where McLachlin C.J. holds that the honour of the
Crown is always at stake in its dealings with aboriginal peoples.
The Crown has the general duty to determine, recognize and
respect the rights of aboriginal groups over which it has asserted
sovereignty. This in turn binds the Crown to enter into treaty
negotiations with aboriginal peoples for the purpose of
reconciling their rights with the advent of Crown sovereignty
and to achieve a just settlement. Pending the conclusion of

25

Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada [2002] S.C.R. (S.C.C.) at paras. 79-80.

26

Mitchell v. M.N.R. [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 (S.C.C.) at para. 9.

27

Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests) [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511
(S.C.C.) at paras. 16-25.

14
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treaties determining these rights, the Crown has a duty to
consult with aboriginal peoples whenever it undertakes actions
that may affect their asserted rights, and also to accommodate
these rights where necessary. In situations where the Crown has
assumed discretionary control over specific aboriginal interests,
the honour of the Crown gives rise to a fiduciary duty. This
generally requires the Crown to act with reference to the
aboriginal group’s best interest in exercising its discretion over
the specific aboriginal interest at stake.
In effect, then, the generic right to honourable treatment gives
rise to a range of more precise rights and duties that attach to
specific subject-matters in particular contexts. As Binnie J.
explains in the Wewaykum case,28 not all obligations existing
between the parties to a fiduciary relationship are themselves
fiduciary in nature, and this observation holds true of the
relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples. It is
necessary to focus on the particular obligation or interest that is
the subject matter of the dispute and to inquire whether the
Crown had assumed sufficient discretionary control in relation
thereto to ground a fiduciary obligation.
In the context of Indian reserves, for example, the nature and
intensity of the Crown’s fiduciary duties differ depending on
whether the subject-matter relates to the creation of a new
reserve or the protection of an existing reserve.29 Where the
Crown sets out to create a new reserve in lands where the Indian
beneficiaries have no prior treaty or aboriginal claims, its
fiduciary duties are limited to the basic obligations of loyalty,
good faith in the discharge of its mandate, providing full
appropriate disclosure, and acting in the best interest of the

28

Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada [2002] S.C.R. (S.C.C.) at para. 83.

29

Ibid. at paras. 86-104.
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beneficiaries. However, once a reserve has been created, the
Crown’s fiduciary duties expand to include the protection and
preservation of the Indian band’s interest from exploitation.

D. THE
TITLE)

RIGHT TO AN ANCESTRAL TERRITORY (ABORIGINAL

Aboriginal peoples have the right to the exclusive possession
and use of lands occupied at the time of sovereignty. Aboriginal
title exists as a burden on the Crown’s underlying title and may
30
not be transferred to third parties but only ceded to the Crown.
As seen earlier, aboriginal title has a uniform legal character,
which does not vary from group to group according to their
customs. At the same time, aboriginal title provides a
framework for the internal operation of the distinctive land laws
of each aboriginal group and so allows for quite varied regimes of
property rights and interests.31
Aboriginal title is similar in this respect to the title held by the
provinces to lands within their boundaries under section 109 of
the Constitution Act, 1867. In principle, the provincial title is a
uniform one and gives provinces the same range of rights to
their lands and resources, subject to any specific constitutional
provisions. However, land laws obviously vary from province to
province and generate distinctive regimes of property rights and
interests. The property system of Quebec is very different from
that of Manitoba.

30

31

Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.).

See Brian Slattery, “The Metamorphosis of Aboriginal Title” (2006) 85 Can.
Bar Rev. (forthcoming) and references in footnote 13, above.
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E. THE RIGHT OF CULTURAL INTEGRITY
As seen earlier, in Van der Peet the Supreme Court recognizes
that aboriginal peoples have the right to maintain the central
and significant features of their historical cultures. The generic
right of cultural integrity gives birth to a host of specific rights
that differ from group to group in accordance with their
distinctive practices, customs and traditions, such as the right to
hunt, the right to fish, the right to harvest certain natural
resources, the right to practice a certain religion, the right to
speak a certain language, and so on. Despite such differences,
these specific rights fall into a number of broad classes, which
relate to such subjects as livelihood, religion, language, and art.
These classes constitute generic cultural rights of intermediate
generality.
For example, the right to practice a traditional religion arguably
qualifies as an intermediate cultural right because spirituality is
normally a central and significant feature of aboriginal societies.
Viewed in the abstract, this right has a uniform scope, which
does not vary from one aboriginal people to another. However,
the particular activities protected by the right differ from group
to group, depending on the distinctive religious practices and
beliefs of the group. In effect, then, the generic right of cultural
integrity harbours an intermediate right to practice a traditional
religion, which in turn shelters a plethora of specific religious
rights vested in particular aboriginal groups.
Consider another example. Aboriginal groups arguably have the
constitutional right to use their ancestral languages and to
engage in the activities needed to maintain and perpetuate these
languages, such as teaching these languages at school. The
language of a group is normally an integral feature of its
ancestral culture and an important means by which the culture
is manifested, nurtured and transmitted. So the right to speak an
aboriginal language has a strong claim to qualify as a cultural
right of intermediate generality. According to this approach, the
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abstract dimensions of this right are identical in all aboriginal
groups where the right occurs, however it gives rise to specific
rights to speak and transmit particular aboriginal languages.
Perhaps the most important intermediate right is what we may
call the right of livelihood. A fundamental principle informing
the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty was that an aboriginal
people could continue to gain its living in its accustomed
manner. Justice McLachlin identified this right in her dissenting
32
opinion in the Van der Peet case. Citing the terms of treaties
and the Royal Proclamation of 1763,33 she observed:
These arrangements bear testimony to the acceptance
by the colonizers of the principle that the aboriginal
peoples who occupied what is now Canada were
regarded as possessing the aboriginal right to live off
their lands and the resources found in their forests and
streams to the extent they had traditionally done so.
The fundamental understanding—the Grundnorm of
settlement in Canada—was that the aboriginal people
could only be deprived of the sustenance they
traditionally drew from the land and adjacent waters
by solemn treaty with the Crown, on terms that would
ensure to them and to their successors a replacement
for the livelihood that their lands, forests and streams
had since ancestral times provided them.34

32

R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.) at paras. 270-72.

33

Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763. The most accurate printed text is
found in Clarence S. Brigham, ed., British Royal Proclamations Relating to
America (Worcester, Mass.: American Antiquarian Society, 1911), 212.
34

R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.) at para. 272.
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This viewpoint later attracted the Supreme Court’s support in
35
the Marshall case. In the course of interpreting a Mi’kmaq
treaty concluded in 1760, Justice Binnie appealed to a
fundamental precept of British imperial practice in North
America, which held that when an aboriginal people passed
under Crown sovereignty it was entitled to continue to sustain
itself in the manner it had done previously. As Justice Binnie
noted dryly, this principle was not wholly disinterested:
Peace was bound up with the ability of the Mi’kmaq
people to sustain themselves economically. Starvation
breeds discontent. The British certainly did not want
the Mi’kmaq to become an unnecessary drain on the
public purse of the colony of Nova Scotia or of the
Imperial purse in London, as the trial judge found. To
avoid such a result, it became necessary to protect the
traditional Mi’kmaq economy, including hunting,
gathering and fishing.36
The right of livelihood attracted detailed discussion in the
37
recent Sappier case, where Justice Bastarache held that the
weight of authority supports the view that section 35 protects
the means by which an aboriginal society traditionally sustained
itself. He went on to explain that the doctrine of aboriginal
rights arises from the simple fact of prior occupation of the lands
now forming Canada. So the Court’s focus should be on the
nature of this prior occupation. This involves an inquiry into the
traditional way of life of a particular aboriginal community,
including their means of survival.

35

R. v. Marshall [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 (S.C.C.).

36

Ibid. at para. 25. See also: Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of
Canadian Heritage) [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388 (S.C.C.) at para. 26.
37

R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray 2006 SCC 54 (S.C.C.) esp. at paras. 37-40, 45.
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In summary, the right of cultural integrity forms a pyramid with
three levels. At the top is the abstract right itself, which takes
the same general form in all aboriginal groups. Beneath this lies
a tier of intermediate generic rights which relate to distinct
subject-matters such as livelihood, religion, language and art. At
the bottom rests a broad range of specific rights that differ from
group to group in accordance with their particular cultural
characteristics.

F. THE RIGHT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT
Aboriginal peoples have the right to govern themselves within a
federal constitutional framework characterized by a division of
powers among various orders of government.38 This right finds
its source in the British Crown’s recognition that it could not
secure the amity of the indigenous nations over which it
claimed sovereignty without acknowledging their right to
manage their own internal affairs. As Justice Lamer noted in the
Sioui case,39 the Crown treated Indian nations with generosity
and respect, out of the fear that the safety and development of
British colonies would otherwise be compromised:
The British Crown recognized that the Indians had
certain ownership rights over their land, it sought to
establish trade with them which would rise above the
level of exploitation and give them a fair return. It also
allowed them autonomy in their internal affairs,
intervening in this area as little as possible.

38

Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Ottawa:
Canada Communication Group, 1996); Campbell v. British Columbia
(Attorney General) [2000] 4 C.N.L.R. 1 (B.C.S.C.); Brian Slattery, "First
Nations and the Constitution: A Question of Trust" (1992) 71 Can. Bar Rev.
261 at 278-87.

39

R. v. Sioui [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025 (S.C.C.) at 1054-55, emphasis added.
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It is submitted that the right of self-government is a generic
right, which recognizes a uniform set of governmental powers
held by aboriginal peoples as a distinct order of government
within the Canadian federal system. At the same time, it allows
aboriginal groups to establish and maintain their own
constitutions, which take a variety of forms. There are close
parallels here to the provinces, which possess a set of generic
governmental powers under s. 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867,
but also are entitled to maintain distinctive provincial
constitutions.
It could be argued that the aboriginal right of self-government is
not a generic right but a collection of specific rights, each of
which has to be proven separately under the Van der Peet test.40
In the Pamajewon case,41 the Supreme Court viewed the
question through the lens of Van der Peet and held that the right
of self-government would have to be proven as an element of
specific practices, customs and traditions integral to the
particular aboriginal society in question. According to this
approach, the right of self-government would be a collage of
specific rights to govern particular activities rather than a
generic right to deal with a range of abstract subject-matters.
However, the Pamajewon case was decided prior to the Court’s
decision in Delgamuukw, which expanded the horizons of
aboriginal rights and recognized the category of generic rights.
In the light of Delgamuukw, it seems more sensible to treat the
right of self-government as a generic aboriginal right rather than
a bundle of specific rights. On this view, the right of selfgovernment is governed by uniform principles laid down by

40

The following discussion draws on Brian Slattery, "Making Sense of
Aboriginal and Treaty Rights" (2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 196 at 213-14.
41

R. v. Pamajewon [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821 (S.C.C.), at 832-33.
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Canadian common law. The basic scope of the right does not
vary from group to group; however its application to a particular
group differs depending on the circumstances. This is the
approach taken in the Report of the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples, which the Supreme Court cites in its brief
comments on self-government in the Delgamuukw case.42
Nevertheless, certain other observations made in Delgamuukw
might be considered adverse to this approach. In declining to be
drawn into an analysis of self-government, the Court reiterates
its holding in Pamajewon that rights to self-government cannot
be framed in “excessively general terms” and notes that the
aboriginal parties to the case had advanced the right to selfgovernment “in very broad terms, and therefore in a manner not
cognizable under s. 35(1).”43 It is submitted that these remarks
should be understood simply as a warning against overambitious litigation, which attempts to induce the courts to
settle very difficult questions in a vacuum, without an
appropriate factual or doctrinal context.44

42

Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.), at 1115;
see Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Ottawa:
Canada Communication Group, 1996), Vol. 2, Part 1, esp. at 163-280. On the
right of self-government, see Patrick Macklem, "First Nations SelfGovernment and the Borders of the Canadian Legal Imagination" (1991) 36
McGill L.J. 382; Brian Slattery, "First Nations and the Constitution: A
Question of Trust" (1992) 71 Can. Bar Rev. 261 at 278-87; Patrick Macklem,
"Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples" (1993) 45
Stanf. L. Rev. 1311.

43

44

Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.), at 1114-15.

As the Court states: “The broad nature of the claim [of self-government] at
trial also led to a failure by the parties to address many of the difficult
conceptual issues which surround the recognition of aboriginal selfgovernment. ... We received little in the way of submissions that would help
us to grapple with these difficult and central issues. Without assistance from
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IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GENERIC AND
SPECIFIC RIGHTS
The link between generic and specific rights should now be
clear. Specific rights are concrete instances of generic rights. So,
for example, the generic right to honourable treatment by the
Crown operates at a high level of abstraction and harbours a
range of intermediate generic rights relating to different subjectmatters, such as the creation of Indian reserves or the protection
of existing reserves. These intermediate rights, in turn, engender
myriad specific fiduciary rights vesting in particular aboriginal
groups, whose precise scope is determined by the concrete
circumstances in which they arise. Similarly, the broad right of
cultural integrity fosters a range of intermediate generic rights,
which relate to such matters as livelihood, language and
religion. These intermediate rights give birth to specific rights,
whose character is shaped by the practices, customs and
traditions of particular aboriginal groups.
The precise relationship between generic and specific rights
varies depending on the generic right in question. Consider, for
example, the generic right of self-government. As just seen, this
arguably confers the same set of governmental powers on all
aboriginal peoples in Canada. In this respect, the right of selfgovernment resembles the uniform package of governmental
powers vested in the provinces. However, this abstract
homogeneity does not mean that aboriginal peoples possess the
same internal constitutions and governmental structures or that
they exercise their governmental powers up to their full
theoretical limits. An important component of the aboriginal
right of self-government is the power of an aboriginal group to

the parties, it would be imprudent for the Court to step into the breach.”;
ibid., at 1115.
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establish and amend its own constitution within the
overarching framework of the Canadian Constitution. This
power parallels the power of a province to amend its own
constitution under section 45 of the Constitution Act, 1982. So,
it appears that the generic right of self-government, in allowing
for the creation of a variety of governmental structures,
engenders a range of specific governmental powers and rights, as
detailed in the particular constitutions of aboriginal groups.
However, not all generic rights blossom into specific rights. For
example, the generic right to conclude treaties empowers
aboriginal groups to enter into binding agreements with the
Crown. As such, the right gives rise to a wide array of treaties,
which differ in subject-matter and scope. While it is true that
each such treaty represents the concrete application of the
abstract generic right, it seems an excess of legal logic to say
that each treaty therefore represents a “specific aboriginal
right”. Similarly, the generic right to an autonomous legal
system harbours a host of distinct legal systems enjoyed by
particular aboriginal groups. Although each such system is a
concrete manifestation of the overarching generic right, it is
arguably artificial to treat it as a specific right.
While not all generic rights give birth to specific rights, all
specific rights are the offspring of generic rights. In other words,
there are no “orphan” specific rights. The reason is that generic
rights provide the basic rules governing the recognition and
scope of specific rights. So an aboriginal group cannot possess a
specific right unless it is rooted in a generic right; by the same
token, the scope of a specific right cannot exceed the basic
dimensions of the generic right that engenders it.

V. THE UNIVERSALITY OF GENERIC RIGHTS
Generic rights are not only uniform in character, they are also
universal in distribution. They make up a set of fundamental
rights presumptively held by all aboriginal groups in Canada.
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There is no need to prove in each case that a group has the right
to conclude treaties with the Crown, to enjoy a customary legal
system, to benefit from the honour of the Crown, to occupy its
ancestral territory, to maintain the central attributes of its
culture, or to govern itself under the Crown’s protection. It is
presumed that every aboriginal group in Canada has these
fundamental rights, in the absence of valid legislation or treaty
stipulations to the contrary. This situation is hardly surprising,
given the uniform application of the doctrine of aboriginal rights
across the country as a matter of Canadian common law. This
doctrine applies to all the territories currently forming part of
Canada, regardless of the precise manner in which the Crown
acquired them or their original status as French or English
colonies.45
The generic rights held by aboriginal peoples resembles the set
of constitutional rights vested in the provinces under the general
provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867. Just as every province
presumptively enjoys the same array of governmental powers,
regardless of its size, population, wealth, resources or historical
circumstances, so also every aboriginal group, large or small,
presumptively enjoys the same range of generic aboriginal
rights.
However this conclusion could be disputed. For example, it
could be argued that the generic right of aboriginal title is not a
universal right. According to this viewpoint, certain aboriginal
peoples did not have sufficiently stable connections with a
definite territory to hold aboriginal title, although they may
possess specific rights of hunting, fishing and gathering. Certain
musings of the Supreme Court seem to entertain this

45

See R. v. Côté [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139 (S.C.C.) at paras. 42-54; R. v. Adams
[1996] 3 S.C.R. 101 (S.C.C.) at paras. 31-33; Brian Slattery, "Understanding
Aboriginal Rights" (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727 at 736-41.
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possibility.46 However, the better view is that every aboriginal
group presumptively holds aboriginal title to an ancestral
territory, and that very strong evidence would be needed to
overturn this presumption.

VI. THE INCEPTION OF ABORIGINAL RIGHTS
As a matter of Canadian law, aboriginal rights came into
existence when the Crown gained sovereignty over an aboriginal
people—what we will call the “time of sovereignty”. Before that
time, the relations between an aboriginal people and the Crown
were governed by international law and the terms of any
treaties. Although aboriginal peoples clearly held rights in
international law prior to the time of sovereignty (and continue
to hold certain international rights today), it was only when the
Crown gained sovereignty that aboriginal rights as such arose in
Canadian law.47 So, it seems natural to think that the relevant
historical date for establishing the existence of aboriginal rights
is the time of sovereignty. However, the matter is not so
straightforward. We have to distinguish between generic and
specific rights.

46

See R. v. Adams [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101 (S.C.C.) at paras. 27-28; R. v.
Marshall/R. v. Bernard [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220 (S.C.C.) at paras. 58-59, 66. For
discussion, see B. J. Burke, "Left Out in the Cold: The Problem with
Aboriginal Title Under Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 for
Historically Nomadic Aboriginal Peoples" (2000) 38 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1; Brian
Slattery, “The Metamorphosis of Aboriginal Title” (2006) 85 Can. Bar Rev.
(forthcoming).
47

For discussion of indigenous rights in international law, see S. James Anaya,
Indigenous Peoples in International Law (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1996).
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A. GENERIC RIGHTS
As seen earlier, when an aboriginal people passes under the
Crown’s sovereignty, it automatically gains a set of generic
rights—the right of cultural integrity, the right to honourable
treatment by the Crown, and so on. These rights come into
existence at the time of sovereignty and possess a uniform
character. Nevertheless, some generic rights have concrete
aspects that change over time. For example, although the
generic right to customary law arises at the time of sovereignty,
the particular bodies of customary law protected by the right are
not static but continue to evolve and adapt to keep pace with
societal changes. It follows that the relevant date for
determining the existence of a particular rule of customary law
is not the date of sovereignty but the date of the activity or
transaction whose legality is in question. So, for example, the
validity of a purported customary adoption that occurred in 1960
has to be determined by the customary rules prevailing at that
date. Of course, the applicable rules must have existed for an
appreciable period of time for them to gain the status of
customary law. However, there is no need to show they existed
at the time of sovereignty.
Aboriginal title provides a different example. As seen earlier,
when an aboriginal people passes under Crown sovereignty, it
automatically gains title to its ancestral territories in Canadian
law. So, prima facie, the boundaries of an aboriginal territory are
ascertained by reference to the situation at the time of
48
sovereignty. However, this general rule is subject to two
qualifications, which we can discuss only briefly. The first
relates to the Royal Proclamation of 1763, and the second to
historical migrations.

48

Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.) at paras.
143-45.
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The Royal Proclamation of 1763 recognizes the rights of all
aboriginal peoples living under the Crown’s protection to the
49
lands in their possession. It accepts the pattern of indigenous
occupation existing in 1763 as the basis for aboriginal land
rights, regardless of patterns of occupation that prevailed in
earlier eras. So the Proclamation seems to provide a common
historical baseline for all aboriginal groups living under British
protection in 1763. However, there is good reason to think that,
as of that date, the British Crown claimed sovereignty over the
entirety of the territories now making up Canada.50 So, the year
1763 arguably constitutes a uniform baseline for the entire
country, from Newfoundland in the east to British Columbia in
the west.
The second qualification relates to historical migrations. In the
fluid conditions that prevailed in early periods of Canadian
history, it was common for aboriginal groups to migrate to new
areas due to warfare, environmental change, depletion of
resources, internal conflict, economic opportunities, and similar
factors. The onset of Crown sovereignty did not bring this

49

The Proclamation’s text is found in Clarence S. Brigham, ed., British Royal
Proclamations Relating to America (Worcester, Mass.: American Antiquarian
Society, 1911), 212. For detailed discussion, see Brian Slattery, The Land
Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples, As Affected by the Crown's
Acquisition of Their Territories (D.Phil. thesis, Oxford University, 1979;
reprint, Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1979) at
204-82; Brian Slattery, "The Hidden Constitution: Aboriginal Rights in
Canada" (1984) 32 Am. J. Comp. L. 361 at 368-72; Brian Slattery, "The Legal
Basis of Aboriginal Title", in Aboriginal Title in British Columbia:
Delgamuukw v. The Queen, ed. F. Cassidy (Lantzville, B.C.: Oolichan Books,
1992) at 121-29.
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See Brian Slattery, The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples, As
Affected by the Crown's Acquisition of Their Territories (D.Phil. thesis,
Oxford University, 1979; reprint, Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan
Native Law Centre, 1979) at 175-90.
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process to a sudden halt. Aboriginal groups continued to migrate
in response to changes in their circumstances. With the
establishment of effective British government and the creation
of reserves, aboriginal mobility was gradually reduced, although
in some areas it persisted into relatively recent times. When an
aboriginal group migrated to a new area after the date of Crown
sovereignty (or after the year 1763, whichever is later), it seems
arguable that within a certain period—perhaps twenty to fifty
years—it would gain aboriginal title to the new territory that it
occupied while losing title to the territory it left behind.51

B. SPECIFIC RIGHTS
As we have seen, specific aboriginal rights arise under the
auspices of their generic counterparts. While generic rights come
into existence at the time of sovereignty, specific rights do not
necessarily originate at that date. For example, the broad
principle of the honour of the Crown takes force at the time of
sovereignty, however specific fiduciary rights normally stem
from events occurring well after that time, as when aboriginal
lands are ceded to the Crown or a reserve is created. In such
cases the relevant date for proving a specific fiduciary right is
obviously the date of the event that triggered it, not the date of
sovereignty.
A more difficult issue is posed by the right of cultural integrity.
Like other generic rights, the abstract right comes into existence
at the time of sovereignty, and the same holds true of the
intermediate generic rights that shelter under its auspices. What,
then, of the specific cultural rights that occupy the bottom tier
in the pyramid? In principle these specific rights cannot date

51

See Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.) per La
Forest J. at paras. 197-98; Brian Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights"
(1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727 at 741-44, 755-69.
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from a period earlier than the time of sovereignty, because as a
matter of Canadian law (as distinct from indigenous law or
international law) they do not exist prior to that date. So,
presumably they must arise either at the time of sovereignty or
at some later period, depending on the precise nature of the right
in question.
However, here we must draw a distinction between the date
that a specific cultural right comes into existence and the date
by reference to which its concrete content is determined—for
the two are not necessarily the same. Supposing that a specific
cultural right originates at the time of sovereignty, at what date
is its concrete content fixed? This question is bedevilled by a
puzzling problem. It stems from the fact that aboriginal cultures
(like all cultures) are not static but undergo significant changes
over time. After Europeans arrived in North America, aboriginal
societies responded in a dynamic fashion to new opportunities,
circumstances and influences.52 Just as European cultures
quickly adopted many products of American origin, such as
tomatoes, corn and potatoes (to say nothing of tobacco), so also
native American cultures swiftly absorbed many items of
European origin, such as horses, metal artefacts and firearms.
Trade in furs, skins and fish transformed the economies of
aboriginal societies and helped sustain the economies of the
settler colonies. Christianity also had a notable impact on many
aboriginal societies, as did aboriginal conceptions of personal
freedom and federalism on European political thought. While
venereal syphilis (often thought to be of American origin) took
its toll in European societies, European diseases such as
smallpox decimated many aboriginal societies and caused
important changes in lifestyle, political organization and

52

For a good survey, see Colin G. Calloway, New Worlds for All: Indians,
Europeans, and the Remaking of Early America (Baltimore, Md.: John
Hopkins University Press, 1997).
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outlook.53 So the question arises, given the dynamic nature of
aboriginal cultures and the fact that they underwent significant
changes both before and after sovereignty, by reference to what
time period should the concrete content of specific cultural
rights be fixed?
It is submitted that the most workable answer to this question
is as follows. The doctrine of aboriginal rights and the honour of
the Crown assured an aboriginal society that it had the right to
retain and develop the central features of its culture as these
existed at the time of effective Crown control. This approach
universalizes the benchmark date laid down for Metis peoples in
54
the Powley case, where the Court held that section 35 protects
the customs and traditions that were historically important
features of Métis communities “prior to the time of effective
European control”. While the ruling is explicitly limited to
Metis groups, we submit that it should apply to aboriginal
groups across the board. It is hard to see why Indian and Inuit
peoples, who often had close social and economic links with
Metis groups, should have their aboriginal rights determined at a
different date. Such a discrepancy leads only to bizarre and
unjust results, whereby the Metis partners in a trading
relationship would gain aboriginal rights denied to their Indian
partners, simply due to a difference in benchmark dates.
Of course, aboriginal cultures could (and did) change
dramatically after the time of effective Crown control. In
principle, an aboriginal society was free to take its cultural and

53

See Bruce G. Trigger & William R. Swagerty, "Entertaining Strangers: North
America in the Sixteenth Century", in The Cambridge History of the Native
Peoples of the Americas, Vol. 1: North America, Part 1, ed. B. G. Trigger and
W. E. Washburn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) at 363.
Syphilis was probably carried back to Europe as early as 1493.
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economic life in any direction it found congenial. However, the
Crown’s honour was only pledged to protect the central aspects
of an aboriginal society as they existed at the time of effective
55
control and later evolved to adapt to modern conditions.
Beyond that point, the members of aboriginal societies enjoyed
the same legal rights and liabilities at common law as other
members of the larger society.56
The rationale for this approach is not hard to understand. When
aboriginal peoples were confronted with encroaching Crown
control, they were apprehensive that their lives would undergo
swift and forced change in unwelcome and harmful ways. They
required assurance that they could continue in their current
modes of life and adapt their societies at the pace and in the
ways they considered desirable. The honour of the Crown was
committed to providing this assurance, both as a matter of basic
justice and also because it was necessary to maintain the
friendship of aboriginal peoples, which was crucial to the peace
and security of the colonies. So, in light of this rationale, it is
submitted that the benchmark date for specific cultural rights is
the period at which the Crown gained effective control over a
particular aboriginal group.
However, in Van der Peet,57 the Supreme Court took a different
approach. It held that the date for fixing the content of specific
cultural rights is the time of European contact rather than
effective control. The Court apparently considered that the right
of cultural integrity was designed to preserve the central aspects
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On the evolution of aboriginal rights, see esp. R. v. Sparrow [1990] 1 S.C.R.
1075 (S.C.C.) at p. 1093; R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray 2006 SCC 54 (S.C.C.) at
paras. 48-49.

56

However, the Indian Acts notoriously did not respect this basic principle.

57

R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.).
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of an aboriginal culture as these existed in their “original” form,
prior to changes arising from European influence. The Court
seems to have thought that there existed ideal types of
aboriginal societies, untouched by outside influences, in the
misty period prior to European contact. However, this approach
loses sight of the underlying rationale for the right of cultural
integrity, which is rooted in the honour of the Crown. It also
makes little historical sense. For example, when the Indian
nations of New France fell under effective British rule after
1763, it would have strange for the Crown to seek to win their
amity by guaranteeing the basic features of their cultures as
these existed as much as two hundred years previous, when
French adventurers first sailed up the St. Lawrence River. An
approach less apt to win the friendship of the Indian nations and
ensure the future security of Quebec can hardly be imagined.

VII. CONCLUSION
We have seen that aboriginal rights fall into two basic classes:
generic rights and specific rights. Generic rights comprise a
range of basic rights presumptively held by all aboriginal groups
under Canadian common law. They include the right to
conclude treaties, the right to customary law, the right to
honourable treatment by the Crown, the right to an ancestral
territory, the right of cultural integrity, and the right of selfgovernment. These abstract rights have a uniform character,
which does not change from group to group. Specific rights, by
contrast, arise under the auspices of generic rights and assume
different forms in different aboriginal groups, depending on the
particular circumstances of each group. Ranged between basic
generic rights and specific rights are rights of intermediate
generality, which relate to particular subject-matters. We
suggest that this scheme provides a simple and practical way of
understanding the otherwise bewildering array of aboriginal
rights recognized in section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

